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The dynamics of professional football today rest largely on 
market transactions, in the sense that financial negotia-
tions with players and between clubs are among its most 
obvious working principles. The term “transfer market” 
refers to the very fluid contours of players’ mobility as they 
move from one club-employer to another. That mobility is 
underpinned by the so-called “limited time” contract in-
troduced in 1973 – at the behest of player-employees – 
under State control in France (Wahl and Lanfranchi 1995), 
later spreading to all the countries of Europe (Kuypers and 
Szymanski 1999). Limited time contracts have replaced the 
life-time agreements that attached professional players to 
their clubs until age 35 (in other words for the duration of 
their entire career), and give them the right to negotiate 
limited contracts that can be terminated ahead of time in 
exchange for financial compensation (paid by the club 
“buying” the player from the original club). That develop-
ment significantly transformed the rules governing profes-
sional careers as well as the competition and cooperation 
between clubs, where sports and economics are inextrica-
bly linked.1 
The importance of transfers – those actually completed or 
those simply imagined – explains why commenting on 
them, along with reporting on games and on the results of 
competitions, is today such an important part of the narra-
tive presenting professional football. More than any other 
sport in Europe, football is structured by those exchanges, 
and the competitive success of a professional football club 
depends largely on its ability to attract the best players. In 
fact, the “differentiated modes of managing players’ em-
ployment contracts”, chosen by the clubs according to 
their means, are what allows them to respond to the tre-
mendous economic uncertainty of professional sports 
(Bourg and Gouguet 1998: 153). Their strategies fit in with 
players’ career plans, making for very intense matching. 
From that point of view, professional football is as much 
the result of market and salary dealings as it is of a sports 
competition; the two aspects are tightly interwoven, as 
shown by the fact that sports performances, reflected in 
the championship rankings, and the amount of money 
clubs spend on salaries, are (spectacularly) correlated 
(Kuypers and Szymanski 1999; Dobson and Goddard 2011; 
Drut 2011). 
The escalation of European professional football clubs’ 
financial resources, further amplified by the explosion of 
rights to television coverage (Andreff and Staudohar 
2000), has made economists sit up and take notice, and 
begin analyzing the players’ job market. In particular, they 
have attempted to explain what determines the ever 
greater discrepancy between salary levels and the amounts 
involved in transfers (for an overview, see Frick 2007). In 
the light of that research, the status of the sports labor 
market as a “laboratory” is today well established (Kahn 
2000; Rosen and Sanderson 2001). The field can also be 
considered an arena for debate and collaboration between 
economics and sociology, for sociologists have also and 
simultaneously become interested in players’ work and 
careers. Today, a series of studies containing information 
on the situation of football players viewed from various 
angles are available, among others: the inequalities of 
remunerations; forms of employment and their connection 
to the clubs; working and training conditions, etc. (see e.g. 
Bertrand 2012; Faure and Suaud 1999; Rasera 2012; Ro-
derick 2006b; a). These publications highlight the fragility 
of individual careers and the instability of work collectives; 
they show that the vast differences in recognition and 
remuneration make modern professional football closely 
resemble a “winner-take-all market”, typical of a “super-
star economy” (Rosen 1981; Rosen and Sanderson 2001; 
Benhamou 2002; Frank and Cook 2010 [1995]). 
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Sports agents today are the inevitable middle-men in that 
economy, they are at the heart of the rounds of negotia-
tions about transfers. Yet, their place in sociological and 
economic analyses has remained marginal.2 We thus have 
available few indications of their role as catalysts in the 
mobility typical of contemporary football. Sociological 
interest in the activity of matching is also stressed by the 
development of that profession alongside the ever-
growing financial flows that define football economics. 
Such concomitance at the very least bids us look beyond 
the most common discourse on the subject, which whittles 
agents down to being economic parasites, or holds them 
responsible for the excessive commodification of the “no-
ble arena of sports”. Based on ongoing research,3 we 
propose to analyze the role and influence of players’ 
agents on the forms and contents of the transactions that 
characterize the economy of professional football. We will 
start by accounting for the properties that structure the 
market of professional football players, before illustrating 
the main features of what sports agents actually do on 
that market, as individuals and collectively. 
1 A market with specific properties 
According to the legal French definition, a sports agent is 
someone who “for a fee, introduces players to clubs with a 
view to negotiating or renegotiating an employment con-
tract or introduces two clubs to one another with a view to 
concluding a transfer agreement, in compliance with the 
provisions set forth in the Regulations Governing the Ap-
plication of the FIFA Statutes”.4 The agent is therefore a 
labor market intermediary, defined as the third party on 
whom relations in the game of supply and demand de-
pend, and who participate in a transaction by researching 
eventual players, preparing the choice and providing in-
formation on the candidate (Bessy and Eymard-Duvernay 
1997). The agent is paid when the matching is successful, 
not for all the contacts he may have had a hand in arrang-
ing. A “players’ agent”5 represents players in front of the 
clubs likely to employ them, and usually pockets between 
7% and 10% of the total salary negotiated for each player 
(either during the hiring process or when the contract is 
being renegotiated). For the player, association with an 
agent enables a better defense of his interest; it also helps 
him to assess his worth on the labor market. In today’s 
football world, it is part of his professional socialization 
and, for young men fresh out of training academy, proof 
they have “caught on to yet another of the obligations of 
the job” (Bertrand 2008: 40). Players take on an agent 
earlier and earlier in their career – as of their first profes-
sional contract, or even sooner (informally). As their repre-
sentatives, agents have become indispensable mediators 
when negotiating a contract between a player and a club, 
and in that sense they participate in the social construction 
of professional football markets. Nevertheless, the transfer 
market possesses structural traits that influence their activi-
ty: though at first sight it appears particularly fluid, the way 
exchanges are arranged is very complex and, on top of 
that, it is an ambivalent market. 
1.1 Fluid but constrained 
First of all, it is hyperactive, functioning at top speed with a 
large volume of transactions relative to the number of 
employers (professional clubs) and employees (professional 
players). Those offering work are limited in number since 
only the clubs in the higher divisions of the championships 
pay their players salaries (though in the lower divisions 
there also exist non-salaried ways of remunerating a play-
er). The number of those looking for work is larger than 
the number of jobs available – about twenty per club – so 
structurally speaking the market is in over-capacity.6 Such 
hyper-activity on the market is partly due to the legal rules 
and regulations that govern the circulation of players and 
define the form of employment contracts. At present, 
contracts are limited to five years and most are actually 
shorter or terminated at an early stage. The same rules for 
contracts and transfers are in force in all European coun-
tries, especially since the 1990s, when the European Court 
of Justice came forth with a series of decisions that con-
tributed to intensifying the international circulation of 
players on the labor market (Gouguet 2005; Pautot 2011), 
and perhaps even to deregulating it (Manzella 2002). In 
fact, various studies7 show that mobility is accelerating, as 
illustrated by the rise in average number of clubs for which 
a footballer will have played over the course of his career.8 
At the same time, careers tend to become briefer and be 
interrupted earlier,9 increasing mobility and the fluidity of 
the market still more. 
That fluidity is channeled however, since negotiations and 
actual transfers are only permitted at specific times of year: 
the inter-season period and mid-season mercato, i.e. dur-
ing approximately four months. Transfers and, broadly 
speaking, preliminary contacts between clubs and players 
are therefore reined in by strict temporal limits. The play-
ers’ market is especially active and liquid at the beginning 
and end of the transfer periods, more particularly during 
the last days and even the last hours, when the pressure of 
the imminent closing incites the parties to clinch an 
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agreement before it is too late. That intensity10 suggests 
that agreements are not always easily arrived at. For, ex-
cept in cases when a player’s employment contract is 
about to expire, any transfer supposes the consent of the 
three parties involved: the player, his present club and his 
future club, which generally means long, drawn-out nego-
tiations. 
1.2 A particularly complex exchange 
A typical exchange on the transfer market is complex and 
can be subdivided into three quite specific sorts of ex-
change that must be finely coordinated for the transfer to 
actually take place. The first concerns the clubs directly – 
potentially buyer and seller – and what is mainly at stake in 
the transaction is the indemnity paid for the transfer and 
the modalities for paying it.11 The indemnity reflects the 
extent of a player’s market value, which depends on a 
variety of disparate parameters: the length of his present 
contract (in this case, the indemnity plays the role of com-
pensation for an anticipated breach of contract), his talents 
as footballer (on which the parties do not necessarily 
agree), his age (i.e. his potential to get better and antici-
pating the profit to be made when he is resold), his degree 
of substitutability (a partly interpretative and subjective and 
partly objective feature based on performance, such as the 
number of goals scored by a striker), both clubs’ respective 
strategies (their determination to sell or buy a player), the 
economic situation of the transfer market (a bullish trend 
over the long term is neither uniform nor regular), etc. 
A second aspect of the exchange concerns the player and 
the club that wants to recruit him. In this case, the object 
of the negotiation bears on the conditions of the contract, 
i.e. an ensemble of factors such as duration, salary, but 
also a whole series of options such as being awarded a 
bonus upon signing the contract or extra remunerations, 
advantages in kind, or inserting particular clauses based on 
the team’s performances – “exit vouchers” in case the 
team counter-performs or is demoted to a lower division, a 
specific bonus for exceptional performance such as qualify-
ing for a European competition or winning a trophy, the 
conditions related to breach of contract (inserting a sur-
render clause specifying a minimum sum for the transfer 
indemnity), etc. Also, often the deal between the employer 
and the new player is not fully contained in the employ-
ment contract: other elements may have been negotiated 
or agreed upon morally or verbally before signing, e.g. 
features concerning the future work context: the club’s 
sports policies and declared ambitions, its playing style and 
the coach’s preferred tactics, the player’s assigned place on 
the team and his role in those tactics, his guarantees as to 
playing time, the number of players on the team vying for 
his position, the other recruitments presently being consid-
ered and the changes that might ensue in the short term, 
etc. All these elements are meant to give the player a 
glimpse of his future role, and in this sense, negotiations 
do not only bear on the conditions and characteristics of 
the contract but also more concretely on the conditions 
and specifics of the job. 
The third component of the exchange concerns the player 
and the club getting ready to transfer him. In fact, every 
departure presupposes an agreement between both par-
ties, concerning the possibility as well as the circumstances 
of his leaving, in particular the destinations accepted or 
rejected – for example, a club may not want to strengthen 
a direct competitor and refuse the transfer, or a player can 
reject the perspective of joining a club or league he doesn’t 
admire. There again, an agreement is necessary, and ac-
cordingly, it may be the result of exchanges taking place 
over the long term between employer and employee, or 
even of a pre-arranged decision – such as when a club 
promises to grant an “exit voucher” for a given date – or it 
may be the outcome of a conflict between the two (a tug 
of war due to a disagreement as to a possible transfer or 
its conditions). Preparing a transfer involves far more than 
the moment the agreement is negotiated; in other words, 
any (future) transfer compensation is also at stake in the 
relations between a player and his club. Adjusting the 
conditions of the employment contract, especially a time 
extension or a raise in salary, is not only a way of acknowl-
edging and rewarding a player for his performance, it is 
also a way for the club to enhance the player’s market 
value in view of a future transfer. This is why employment 
contracts are often subject to adjustments, usually con-
cerning their duration and the remuneration. The relation-
ship between the player and the club that employs him 
thus combines both attachment and detachment, it means 
at once strengthening the contract and getting ready to 
end it. 
1.3 A ambivalent, double and segmented market 
The complexity of that relationship is also the result of the 
ambivalent nature of the player market, which combines 
two interconnected features: it is a job market where hir-
ing and salaries are negotiated, where changes in employ-
er take place and professional careers develop; but it is also 
a securities market where employment contracts are 
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“bought” and investment strategies develop. Players are 
not only their employers’ employees but also, via their 
work contracts, financial assets of sports firms, and they 
figure as such in the latter’s yearly balance sheets (Ascari 
and Gagnepain 2006; Minquet 2004; Paché and N’Goala 
2008). The superposition of those two modes of percep-
tion explains our proposal to describe the player market as 
ambivalent. 
The importance of the financial (speculative) logic must 
nevertheless be tempered by the category of football play-
er concerned. Remunerations and market value are ex-
traordinarily disparate, but those inequalities can be inter-
preted as a duality (Bourg and Gouguet 2001) with, on 
one side, a small number of renowned, top-level players 
and on the other, a mass of average players. Typically, the 
two categories occupy opposite positions on the market. 
The second category of players are in a situation of fierce 
competition and exposed to a high risk of unemployment, 
receive relatively modest salaries and their contracts are 
financial assets of little consequence, whereas the first 
category are in a situation close to an oligopsony, are paid 
very high salaries12 and represent top value assets. Bourg 
and Gouguet oppose a “primary sector”, “characterized 
by jobs implying high levels of responsibility and initiative”, 
where “salaries boost incentive, i.e. are set at a higher level 
compared to ordinary salaries”, to a “secondary sector in 
competition with the primary one”, where salaries are 
“decided by supply and demand, because the productivity-
salary link is much weaker than in the primary sector and 
turnover costs are low” (Bourg and Gouguet 1998: 155). 
Though it is remarkable that the lion’s share of clubs’ prof-
its is captured by the “primary producers”,13 the uneven 
distribution of those revenues must also be noted. Also, 
players who rate highly on the transfer market enrich the 
clubs by virtue of being valorizable assets (Franck and 
Nüesch, 2008). That dichotomy also impacts flow and 
mobility strategies, meaning that “crossing the borders 
between segments is clearly less usual than crossing them 
inside the secondary segment – a downward mobility, 
which in many cases means they stop being professionals. 
Conversely, overstepping the borders within the primary 
market basically means upward mobility, while passing 
from the secondary to the primary market – a rare occur-
rence – depends on one’s position on the waiting-line” 
(Bourg and Gouguet 1998: 150).14 
The way a player relates to his club and career thus varies 
according to the market segment where the contract was 
signed. These segments are not reducible merely to con-
tracts’ register zones; they are characterized by styles of 
interactions, forms of resource management and specific 
cultural representations that make them resemble V. Zeliz-
er’s “commercial circuits” (Zelizer 2006). Each segment is 
for instance marked by a dominant form of competition: in 
broad strokes, club rivalry (those placed at the top of the 
sports and economic pyramids) to attract the star players, 
or rivalry between players (not at the top of the sports 
hierarchy) to find a club. Professional footballers are thus 
confronted with conditions and types of mobility depend-
ing on whether they are recognized as non-substitutable 
workers, or whether they are seen as interchangeable with 
run-of-the-mill qualities. In both cases, however, they call 
upon an agent to “manage their interests”, i.e. see to it 
that their talents are given the recognition they deserve 
both sports-wise and financially, and that their career is 
made more secure with each new contract.15 
2 Agents at the heart of the market 
Seen through a frequently critical lens, agents are viewed 
as collective actors who have managed to gain control of 
commercial exchanges and to orient part of the financial 
flows for their own benefit. Nevertheless, the place that 
agents occupy in the market seems to be less the result of 
a concerted and coherent strategy than it is dependent on 
the “grips” or “affordances”16 that the evolution of pro-
fessional football has gradually revealed. In this sense, 
market work points to collective action which is neither 
necessarily intentional nor clearly original: football players’ 
agents emerged as a professional group when it became 
apparent that they had appropriate an activity they did not 
control the apparition, but from which they then derived a 
certain form of expertise.17 Thus, though they must be 
associated with the recent transformations of the world of 
professional football – increase of financial stakes, rising 
number of transfers, globalization of exchanges, erasing of 
borders, individualization of contracts, etc. – it is hardly 
realistic to credit them with the responsibility for its com-
modification. It seems more appropriate to examine their 
collective history in terms of A. Abbott’s historical sociolo-
gy of the professions (Abbott 1988, Abbott 2005). Players’ 
agents built up their “jurisdiction” in the ecology of pro-
fessional football by responding to a problem encountered 
by its main actors (clubs and players), and made more 
complex by legal and economic evolutions, i.e. mainly the 
problem of job matching. Imposing their presence as 
matching experts, offering to reduce the uncertainties 
connected to sports contracts, they have managed to prof-
itably integrate the economy of professional football and 
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become major players in the field. Despite constant criti-
cism, the success of their integration is such that according 
to many insiders – club staff-members, players or former 
players – now “agents control the market”.18 Top agents 
are described as “the most influential individual[s] in to-
day's game” and their power is referred to as defining 
football’s new age, “and the true transformation of the 
game”.19 
As we have seen (cf. 1), the players’ market is a particularly 
complex one, not only because transfers suppose an 
agreement has been arrived at by three actors and not 
two, as is classically the case,20 but also because each 
bilateral relationship has a temporal and relational con-
sistency, and involves a multiplicity of stakes and con-
cerns.21 The expertise of players’ agents represents a cog-
nitive equipment adapted to that complexity, and their 
growing importance has accompanied (and stimulated) the 
intensification of players’ mobility. From that point of view, 
far from being simple carriers of information, agents signif-
icantly participate in regulating the transfer market. They 
inform it in the sense that they contribute to configuring it, 
to giving it the traits with which their professional partners 
must make do. In other words, they “work the market” 
(Cochoy and Dubuisson-Quellier 2000). We will underline 
three facets of their job: representing players to the clubs, 
which pre-supposes both producing and shaping sports-
men’s qualities; trying to capture quality players in their 
portfolios (which fits in with the permanent struggle be-
tween agents); and developing relations of trust within the 
clubs (which implies penetrating very personalized net-
works). 
2.1 Producing, shaping and protecting players’ qualities 
Albeit asymmetrical, since it is more about players than 
about clubs, information on the professional football mar-
ket is particularly plentiful. Football players are constantly 
being evaluated, partly in the privacy of their training cen-
ters and fitness rooms (Rasera 2012) and partly in public 
spaces, exposing masses of data on their individual per-
formance. The public nature of games and their systematic 
media coverage (at least for the elite divisions), regularly 
replenishes the flow of information. The evolution of spe-
cialized commentary tends toward a growing individualiza-
tion of judgment, and the generalization of performance 
indicators allows evaluation of the quality of a player’s 
accomplishments. These metrics can be applied to a single 
match (the distance he ran, number of times he touched 
the ball, number of successful passes, number of duels 
won or lost, etc.), a season (number of times he was in-
cluded in the starting team, average mark, etc.), or an 
entire career. Available information is therefore not lack-
ing; on the contrary, it is in abundance, and concerns a 
variety of registers and aspects of players’ work: their phys-
ical form, tactical sense, decisive actions, self-control, etc. 
The circuits of relationships between members of the foot-
ball world are an additional source for gleaning more in-
formation about a player, asking for opinions, requesting 
advice. Many clubs also engage “scouts” who scrutinize 
players during matches. 
Few employers can boast of having as much information 
so easily accessible about a vast number of players where-
by to organize their hiring activities as professional football 
club managers do. Information on players’ qualities never-
theless tend to peter off as one descends the sports hierar-
chy: the performances of football stars, especially the most 
famous ones, are what are most in the public eye and 
watched, and their consecration eliminates any doubt 
about their talents. If hiring a star always implies a degree 
of uncertainty – especially concerning the fact they are 
entering a new group – and represents a risk,22 recruiting 
more obscure players, whose qualities as sportsmen are 
more unsure, is another sort of wager for the employer 
clubs. From their point of view, the professional football 
market is not transparent. Though information is available 
and plentiful, it does not abolish the sporting or financial 
risk associated with each recruitment. The agents’ role is to 
contribute to producing and shaping players’ qualities in 
order to reduce the uncertainty as to what they will con-
tribute to the sport and/or how well their contract will sell 
in the future.23 
A survey carried out among agents in the five largest foot-
ball leagues in Europe (Germany, England, Spain, France, 
Italy), shows that 58% of all football players represented 
by an agent are not professionals; they play for the most 
part in the junior leagues (Poli, Rossi and Besson 2012: 63). 
For those candidates waiting to enter the market, appear-
ing unique is crucial and is the aim of their agents’ ef-
forts.24 The latter use classical devices such as videos to 
demonstrate a player’s best performances. Above all, they 
make a player’s portrait more attractive by stressing a dif-
ferent criterion: his personal qualities. All the agents we 
interviewed mentioned how essential it is, during discus-
sions with club officials, to insist on what they call “the 
character”, “the personality”, the “state of mind”, the 
“mind frame” or “psychology” of the player, to train the 
spotlight on qualities otherwise difficult to see and define. 
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For them it is a particularly valuable source of differentia-
tion, because it is often imperceptible to those unac-
quainted intimately with the player and because it provides 
an inexhaustible source of arguments.25 Their job on the 
“secondary market” usually consists in generating supple-
mentary – and decisive, since they reassure the employer – 
differences between players who otherwise possess com-
parable or interchangeable technical, physical and tactical 
competences. That is the form taken by “the economy of 
singularities” (Karpik 2007; 2009) in this market segment. 
We also perceive how agents, by (commercially) exploiting 
their familiarity with the players, are able to influence the 
way the latter are evaluated, thus promoting a different 
form of judging in the hiring process (Marchal & Rieucau 
2010). Their personal standing with the players gives them 
credit among those they are addressing, and allows them 
to play the role of trainer, “developer” of qualities, which 
is what mainly makes their activity meaningful. To fill that 
role, agents must above all win the trust of their profes-
sional partners, meaning both the trust of those who are 
offering as well as those who are looking for employment, 
though for different reasons and thanks to other sorts of 
interactions. 
Their presence also impacts the inherently strained rela-
tions on the labor market between player employees and 
club employers. Though the intensification of the rivalry 
between players and between clubs (see above) makes 
those relations tenser still by undermining the contracts, 
the presence of an agent permits separating the manage-
ment of the employer-employee relationship from the 
acknowledgment of players’ qualities.26 By concentrating 
employers’ critiques on themselves, agents manage to 
safeguard the professional reputation of the sportsmen 
they represent. That protection is all the more necessary as 
the fluidity of the players’ labor market also allows quick 
reversals between adversity and cooperation (a given coach 
might for example come across a given player in another 
club, several months after a conflict). 
2.2 Capturing and ensuring players’ loyalty in a com-
petitive context 
The trust established between player and agent is even 
more imperative when the proxy agreement between them 
is somewhat fragile. A mandate guarantees the legal re-
muneration of the agent who carried out a transfer or 
contract adjustment negotiation successfully. But practical-
ly speaking, mandate’s validity is limited to such events and 
is more a verbal and moral understanding than a legal 
contract promising the lasting nature of the relationship. 
The fragility of their contractual and legal association must 
therefore be compensated for through the reinforcement 
of their interpersonal and service relationship. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that agents tend to broaden the range of 
services they render their players, on one hand to make 
sure of their lasting loyalty, on the other hand to diversify 
their sources of revenue (Masteralexis 2005). Many of 
them develop, either alone or with a partner, activities as 
legal, fiscal, financial consultants or in image management. 
Some make it their business to see to various facets of a 
player’s daily life, such as finding them a place to live or a 
baby-sitter, organizing a house move or a pleasure trip, 
etc. Agents also demonstrate their solicitude in terms of 
psychological support and personal attention, in domains 
that only partly relate to the sport or are even completely 
private. That attachment and allegiance affect the agent-
player relationship, making it extremely personal, which is 
visible particularly in the fact that the former is totally 
available and open to the latter’s demands, wishes, and 
expectations. It is abundantly clear to everyone that these 
are also investment strategies, since they are opportunely 
modulated according to the variation of the player’s per-
formances and agents’ estimates of the amount of eco-
nomic benefits they might derive from them (Roderick 
2006b). The interpersonal dimension and commercial cal-
culations are inextricably linked; for an agent, a player can 
be all at once a friend and a profitable commodity. All the 
more as agents’ careers rest not only on the publicity given 
their competence as negotiators but also on the quality of 
their relationships with their players.27 
Clearly, following up agents’ activities works as an antidote 
against a simplified vision of the market that opposes 
commercial and sentimental logics (cf. Zelizer 2011: 314). 
Like the authors of letters of racommandazione (or “of 
credit”) in the Italy of the Quattrocento, which are the core 
of “the art of the network” studied by McLean 2007 (p. 
150 ff.), agents do distinguish between the two sorts of 
logic, but alternate, stressing one or the other as in a musi-
cal counterpoint, blending them or keeping them separate, 
depending on the situation. 
2.3 Developing trust and infiltrating networks 
Empirical data suggest that players whose careers are on 
an upward course tend to change agents, preferring one 
who operates in the higher segment. The game of selective 
matching is all the more obvious as the population of 
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agents itself is structured like a pyramid. A minority of 
sports agents dominates the elite professional football 
market, and deals with the transfers of the best-known 
and best-paid players.28 In other words, agents too func-
tion on a market where resources are rare, where the me-
chanics of cumulated advantages – Merton’s “Saint-
Matthew effect” (Merton 1968) – give their full measure. 
For competition among agents does not only imply attach-
ing players and having access to the most gifted, it also 
means, symmetrically, being able to access information 
about who is offering work (in view of a transfer but also 
in view of salary enhancement), and retaining the wealthi-
est clubs. The market on which they operate is in fact one 
of “quasi-employment”: “jobs that have not as yet been 
clearly created and waiting to be filled, but can be if an 
opportunity arises” (Bureau and Marchal 2009: 582). The 
outcome of competition among agents depends on know-
ing the milieu, developing know-how not only with players 
but also with their employers: pin-pointing the needs of 
the clubs adapted to their representatives, gaining access 
to those interlocutors who have the power of decision, 
entering into a productive relationship with them, etc. The 
importance of these contacts makes for a practically obses-
sive relationship between an agent and his electronic ad-
dress book, as we noted during our interviews.29 It must 
be said that with the growing number of agents and rising 
financial stakes connected to transfers, those lists of con-
tacts have become proportionally weightier. A player’s 
agent is in fact the archetype of the entrepreneur as seen 
by R. Burt, who notices and takes advantage of the “struc-
tural holes” in the network (Burt 1992). Some of them 
manage to become “indispensable go-betweens” when 
concluding a transfer towards the best clubs, thus monop-
olizing access to resources. In this case, the way agents 
“work the market” obscures the information propagated 
in its most central places.30 
The thickness and quality of an agent’s address book bear 
witness to his integration in the network of professionals: 
it is a status symbol. The telephone numbers of decision-
makers in professional football clubs are an all-important 
resource and source of information. Being able to call 
them up on the phone means having an essential tool to 
work with and is a show of trust on the part of an insider. 
Our interviews allowed us to measure the power of that 
sort of equipment compared to an official French Football 
Federation sports agent’s License. All the studies point to 
the gap between the official permission to exert an activity 
and actually exerting it: the majority of those who could be 
agents are not active on the market, never have been, and 
have lost any illusion of ever being so. At the same time, a 
significant number – though it is difficult to indicate a 
precise figure – of agents practice without a license, some-
times in association with an authorized agent (Demazière 
and Jouvenet 2011; Poli, Rossi and Besson 2012; Sekulovic 
2013). These observations show that the real hurdle for 
entering the profession is not obtaining the official permit 
but the capacity to develop relations of trust within the 
professional network so as to have access to reliable, even 
exclusive, information concerning a club’s needs. From that 
point of view, it is significant that many agents share a 
history of previous, significant experience in the world of 
football: as professional or good amateur players, journal-
ists, talent scouts, coaches, etc. Aside from giving them the 
comprehension of how that specific world functions, with 
its codes, values and norms, that experience allows them 
to accumulate a precious network of relationships. 
The extreme geographic mobility that agents put forward 
as a key feature of their lifestyle is not only due to frequent 
salary negotiations. Most of their displacements are aimed 
at “keeping up their contacts”, i.e. improving the quality 
of their relations with potential partners and informers, in 
and around the clubs. Direct face-to-face relations are thus 
a vital cog in the machinery of the professional football 
market. They are far more essential than clinching a trans-
fer deal, and in reality represent an agent’s most important 
(albeit immaterial) investment. It is all the more obvious as, 
despite regulations and an increasing control of transac-
tions, relations in the agent-player-club representative 
triangle remain strongly marked by informality, verbal 
promises, and handshakes. Various studies (Roderick 
2006b, Shropshire and Davis 2003, Poli 2010) have shown 
that business is not only done, but even prepared thanks 
to those interpersonal relations that fit into a complex 
system of debts and credits, mutual “back scratching” and 
reciprocal exchange of services. 
3 Conclusions 
As a player’s representative, sports agents work at facilitat-
ing transactions and mobility between clubs at the same 
time as they work on furthering their client’s career and 
making it as successful as possible. The activities they de-
ploy to that end affect the economy of professional foot-
ball, and their impact can be considered the professional 
group’s “market work”, made up of both getting actively 
involved and adapting to structural properties. Several 
aspects of that impact have been presented here, concern-
ing the evaluation of players’ qualities, the special relation-
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ships between professional associates, the balance be-
tween the opacity and transparence of the network for its 
leaders. Our analysis shows how this market work is con-
sistent with the fact that employee mobility is “self-
reinforced”, as described by Granovetter (“mobility be-
tween companies creates contacts that in turn promote 
further mobility”; conversely, “internal markets are self-
sufficient”, which in fact counteracts employee mobility, 
Granovetter 2008: 183-184). 
Investigating “market work” also exposes the salient traits 
of the economy of professional football, and, from that 
standpoint, is a good indicator of the way it presently func-
tions both from a structural and a cultural point of view, 
for example, by setting up barriers for entering, by its py-
ramidal structure, informal relations, etc. It also shows the 
value, when analyzing the transactions that inform that 
economy, of crossing perspectives belonging to economic 
sociology, the historical sociology of professions, and the 
sociology of work. This is how it will become possible to 
further refine the comprehension of the processes involved 
in the regulation of the “players market” – a regulation 
that depends on the evolution of legal and sports rules, 
but also on the bets placed by the media and sponsors on 
football as a show, as well as on innovations in sports 
organizations and on the cultural inclinations of profes-
sional groups such as sports agents. Those refinements are 
all the more necessary as it is a somewhat inconsistent 
form of regulation, depending on segments of the market: 
analyzing the variations, and the practices they imply, 
would allow one to better grasp the multiple modes of 
commercial valuing (cf. Beckert and Aspers 2011), as well 
as their fluctuations in the course of a career. 
Agents’ work hinges on two main features of the market 
and how they combine as careers unfold. In fact, accom-
panying their client means playing both sides of the field: 
developing their career in the long term, i.e. seeing the 
player as a worker for whom it is necessary to negotiate 
the transfers that will allow him to progress; and seizing 
each opportunity as it occurs, i.e. seeing the player as an 
asset that must be cashed in on as fast as possible. That 
tension is the main paradox of the commercial work that 
agents accomplish: to give precedence to the first means 
running the risk of not being able to accompany the player 
all the way because the selective matching system weakens 
a player’s attachment and loyalty; but giving precedence to 
the second means risking not being able to achieve an 
interpersonal, trusting relationship with one’s players and 
having to constantly renew one’s portfolio. Do agents, by 
their activities, contribute to reinforcing the gap between 
job and securities markets, or on the contrary, does the 
market work they do reinforce the linkage between the 
two? Certain viewpoints, in particular those recently ex-
pressed by professional football trade-unions, favor the 
first option, deploring the increasing hold that short-term 
norms have on player management,31 or, put otherwise, 
the fact that job market logics have been overshadowed by 
security market logics. But the ambivalence cultivated by 
the agents might also be analyzed in terms of “robust 
action”, i.e. as a source of power in a multi-dimensional 
network (cf. Padgett and Ansell 1993). This implies ques-
tioning the ways sports agents interpret their own work, 
the way they conceive of their job and their definitions of 
professionalism. It also points to a new avenue of research 
where analysis could deepen our comprehension of the 
economics of professional football. 
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Endnotes 
1If cooperation can take place between competitors, it is because, 
in football economics, “a joint intervention by two teams is neces-
sary to achieve the final product” (Bourg and Gouguet 1998 : 
154). It is also clear that those relations concern mainly player 
transfers, because their work is the “practically exclusive, single 
factor of production and it is impossible to reduce its uncertainties 
by replacing work by capital” (idem). 
2Roderick, 2006a is one of the few exceptions. 
3This research concentrates on players’ agents but also concerns 
their professional associates, i.e. other players, trainers, bosses of 
clubs and federations, specialized journalists. The difficulties en-
countered during our investigation – which are not unique (Poli, 
Rossi and Besson 2012) – illustrate the opacity and closed nature 
of the professional group. We also collect and analyze various 
documentary sources: press articles in which agents discuss their 
work, reports on professional football, legal texts, and so on. 
4http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/
51/55/18/players_agents_regulations_2008.pdf, consulted August 
16, 2013. In France, the law defining the profession of sports 
agent was promulgated on June 9, 2010 and codified by articles 
L222-5 through L222-22 of the Sports Code. 
5An agent can also free-lance for a club, for instance to find a 
new employer for a player fallen from grace, or to search for a 
player with a very particular profile. 
6The number in excess varies; it depends on the national market, 
since international mobility, according to the migratory balance it 
induces, contributes to reducing or amplifying the imbalance 
between offer and demand (on footballers’ international migra-
tions, see Poli, 2010). In the case of France, it is possible to give 
an approximation of the over-capacity of the work-force by 
counting the number of players belonging to the National Union 
of Professional Footballers (Union Nationale des Footballeurs 
Professionnels) who still have no contract at the end of the 2012-
2013 season (243, according to the Union’s website.  
http://www.unfp.org/unfp/ce-que-nous-faisons/la-liste-des-
joueurs-libres.html , consulted July 17, 2013). 
7The data presented in the demographic studies of the CIES, 
Centre International d’Étude du Sport (or Professional Football 
Players Observatory, PFPO) give an objective view of the extreme 
fluidity of the market today (Besson, Poli and Ravenel 2013). 
8A shorter contract is not very significant when evaluating the 
actual length of a collaboration, for it can be extended just before 
it ends and bought by a different club.  
9A study on the German Bundesliga shows, for example, that 
over 90% of careers last less than nine years and that over a third 
only last a single year (Frick, Pietzner and Prinz 2007). 
10We have access to precise information on international trans-
fers: in 2012, “64% of transfer activity took place in January, July 
and August (…) Average number of minutes between each trans-
fer on the two busiest days (31 January and 31 August): 5 
minutes” (FIFA 2013: 18). 
11The object of the agreement is more complex, since it system-
atically includes how the indemnity should be paid (eventually by 
installments), and may include clauses on interest rates if a profit 
is made when the player is sold in future. Besides, other players 
with inverse mobility may be included in the exchange, reducing 
the net amount involved in the transfer. 
12Steiner 2011 presents an analysis of the gap between these 
salaries and “the ordinary economic realm”. 
13Economist J. Lancaster notes: “As for where the revenue goes, 
the answer is: straight to the players. That makes football, indeed 
professional sport in general, a model for workers’ power; there 
isn’t another business in the world where so much of the revenue 
goes straight to the primary producers” (Lancaster 2011). 
14For Bourg and Gouguet, “the uncertainty of the clubs’ envi-
ronment is the source [of that] dualism”: keeping up “two differ-
ent but uniform categories of players, […] with very unequal 
levels of remuneration, aspirations, behavior patterns and negoti-
ation power” gives the clubs the elbow-room required to reduce 
the economic risks inherent in any sports competition, and within 
the means they can afford (idem: 145, 158). 
15However, our study shows that an agent’s activity covers far 
more than (re)negotiating contracts, cf. Demazière and Jouvenet 
2011, Demazière and Jouvenet, forthcoming. 
16We extend the concept revealed by the pragmatic sociology of 
expertise developed by Bessy and Chateauraynaud 1995) to the 
collective actor at hand (players’ agents). 
17Precise, socio-historic research retracing the emergence, devel-
opment and institutionalization of sports agents’ activity is lack-
ing. See Abbott 1988; 1995 for empirical and theoretical models. 
18There is a striking contrast with e.g. the impresarios studied by 
J. Rosselli, intermediaries who are torn back and forth by the 
decisions of the powerful bosses of the music industry of the time 
(Rosselli 1984). On the other hand, there is a similarity with the 
role of “market operator” of the artistic intermediaries analyzed 
in Lizé, Naudier and Roueff 2011 and Kemper 2010. The history 
and sociology of artists’ agents (or top models’ agents, cf. Mears 
2011) reveal many points of comparison with our analysis, impos-
sible to detail here. 
19“Now, with the rise of the super-agent (…), the fourth age is 
reached, and a collection of businessmen hold all the power”, 
wrote an editorialist  (http://www.football365.com/f365-
features/8755839/F365-Focus ). 
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20Except in the special and quantitatively marginal case – under-
standable given the foregoing developments – of the mobility of 
players whose contract is coming to an end. To give an exhaustive 
view, we must mention another form of employment wherein the 
exchange concerns only the player and the club employer: hiring a 
young person formed in the club’s own training center. On this 
point, cf. Slimani 1998; Bertrand 2012. 
21This intricacy is further reinforced by the clubs’ habit of lending 
each other part of their work force, a loan than can be accompa-
nied by different clauses, such as the employer accepting to pay 
part of the salary, or an option specifying that the club receiving 
the loan will buy back the contract. It also may happen (and does 
more and more) that companies – mainly South-American – own 
the “rights” to a player, thus acting as “co-owners” of his em-
ployment contract. 
22“It is our job to take risks”, declared M. Seydoux, president of 
a large French club, in response to criticism of the excessive sala-
ries of some of his players. “Criticizing after the fact is easy” (in 
“L’after”, Radio Monte Carlo, program heard on June 24, 2013). 
23Also see Demazière and Jouvenet forthcoming. 
24True, research on the training of junior footballers shows that 
singularity is one of the aim of the learning that structure the way 
training centers operate (Juskowiak 2011, Bertrand 2012). During 
this phase, individualization takes place quite generally in the 
technical training – and more broadly speaking, in the ways of 
behaving towards educators and peers – but it is when they are 
put on the market that their singularity actually becomes real; and 
players’ agents then become a major link. 
25This is quite clear in the expressions they use: a player may be 
“well educated”, “attentive”, “self-controlled”, “respectful”, 
“uncomplicated”, have “an exceptional mind set”, “nerves of 
steel”, etc. 
26Equally, the emergence of literary agents in the “culture and 
commerce” of publishing depended on their ability to play a 
double role: quality filter for the publisher and “tension absorber” 
between the latter and the author (Coser, Kadushin and Powell 
1985: 289, 294). 
27One of the most successful agents today can thus brag about 
the quality of his work by comparing himself – when addressing 
the clubs – to a “Bible or vacuum-cleaner salesman”, or – when 
addressing “his” players – to a doctor who inspires trust in his 
patients (“I don’t wait for the mercato, I create it myself”, inter-
view with M. Raiola, France Football, 23, April 2013, 3498). 
28In the five top European leagues, 50% of the players are repre-
sented by 12% of the agents, and the five top agents of each 
country represent between 19% (England and Italy) and 31% 
(France) of the players (Poli, Rossi and Besson 2012: 17, 32). 
29By extension – in the midst of a culture of mobility and availa-
bility typical of the professional group – that fixation also applies 
to their cell-phones. S. Zafirau made similar observations in his 
ethnography of “talent agencies” (Zafirau 2008: 102). 
30Central in the sense that “the overlapping of the actions of 
[actors] present on the market and their organization create a 
‘center’ that brings together teams with large and stable budgets, 
who have high returns, are exposed to and stimulated by interna-
tional competition, who dispose of efficient technical structures 
and a cutting-edge training, medical and administrative staff” 
(Bourg and Gouguet 1998: 176). 
31From that point of view, the International Union of Professional 
Footballers (Syndicat international des footballeurs professionnels 
or FIFPro, 60.000 members in 42 countries) recently set up a 
workshop “to study the substance and form of the conditions 
that would allow it to lodge a complaint with the European 
Commission against today’s transfer system”. According to Vice-
President Philippe Piat, the initiative is justified by the fact that 
“the transfer system is heading straight into a wall (…) Players are 
made to sign a contract and then sold again. The system is crazy, 
it must be stopped”. Cf. “FIFPro opposes existing system” (La 
FIFPro contre le système actuel , 
http://www.lequipe.fr/Football/Actualites/La-fifpro-contre-le-
systeme-actuel/379931), put on line and consulted June 20, 2013. 
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